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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
The Second Department disapproved of further contraction of the
general rule concerning diagnostic negligence through suspension of
the running of the statute until the time of discovery could have been
made if plaintiff were diligent.1 The court opined "that the preference
for repose which the Statute of Limitations reflects outweighs in this
case the disadvantage to the plaintiff which results from the applica-
tion of the general rule."' 2 In support of the rule it cited natural im-
pairment of memory due to lapse of time and possible subjection of
defendants to claims arising from medical advances subsequent to the
time of the alleged malpractice under litigation.'3 That plaintiff may
not discover the malpractice in time to litigate was no obstacle: igno-
rance of a cause of action does not of itself affect the tolling of the
statute.14
The resolution of the Schiffman case- strict limitation of Flana-
gan - complies with current New York law but not with justice. The
general rule requires further revision. The interests of protecting a
defendant from stale claims should not outweigh the interests of a
plaintiff who did not know and could not have known of the defen-
dant's malpractice.' 5 Commentators have urged that the statute of
limitations should not start to run until plaintiff discovers or with due
diligence should have discovered the malpractice.16 This position has
been adopted by the California courts,17 as the Second Department
noted.'8 Nevertheless, in New York, a plaintiff must institute his action
within three years from the date of the malpractice or, if the "con-
tinuous treatment" rule 9 applies, within three years from termination
of treatment, irrespective of when the alleged malpractice could or
should have been discovered with due diligence. Legislative reconsider-
ation of this rule is clearly warranted.
ARTICLE 3 -JURISDICTION AND SERVICE,
APPEARANCE AND CHOICE OF COURT
CPLR 301: Satisfaction of requirements of commerce clause necessarily
comports with due process.
11 Id. at 33, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 676.
12 Id., 319 N.Y.S.2d at 677.
'aId., 319 N.Y.S.2d at 678.
14 Id. at 34, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 678, citing 509 Sixth Avenue Corp. v. New York City
Transit Authority, 15 N.Y.2d 48, 51, 203 N.E.2d 486, 487, 255 N.Y.S.2d 89, 91 (1964).
157B McKINNEY'S CPLR 214, supp. commentary at 77 (1969).
16 See, e.g., 29 U. Prr. L. REv. 341 (1967); 21 RUTGERs L. Rv. 778 (1967).
17 Thompson v. County of Fresno, 59 Cal. 2d 686, 381 P.2d 924, 31 Cal. Rptr. 44
(1963); Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (Ct. App. 1967); Calvin
v. Thayer, 150 Cal. App. 2d 610, 310 P.2d 59 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
18 36 App. Div. 2d at 35, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 678.
19 See Borgia v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 187 N.E.2d 777, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319
(1962).
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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
Concomitant with the increase in nationalization of commerce
has been expansion of the permissible scope of jurisdiction over non-
domiciliaries. 20 The requirements for obtaining personal jurisdiction
over nondomiciliaries were substantially relaxed when the rigid rule
of Pennoyer v. Neff2' was replaced by the more flexible standard of
International Shoe Co. v. Washington.22 Nevertheless, as a consequence
of territorial limitations on the power of the several states, some re-
strictions on personal jurisdiction of state courts remain in force.2 3 In
determining whether a foreign corporation is doing business within
the state within the meaning of CPLR 301 the decisive question is
"whether the corporation's contacts with the state are sufficient to jus-
tify the exercise of jurisdiction without offending 'traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice.' "24 "However minimal the burden
of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant may not be called upon
to do so unless he has had the 'minimal contacts' with that State that
are a prerequisite to its exercise of power over him."25
In Scanapico v. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad26
the federal courts were called upon to determine whether the
defendant (RF&P) was doing business within New York and thus was
amenable to personal jurisdiction under CPLR 301. Plaintiff, a New
York resident, sued RF&P in the Eastern District Court of New York.
Plaintiff had been injured by a suitcase which fell from an overhead rack
in a railroad car while she was a passenger traveling from Florida to
New York. The train was traveling over the tracks of RF&P between
Washington and Richmond at the time of the injury. RF&P moved to
quash service on the ground that its activities in New York were in-
sufficient, under the federal due process clause and under CPLR 301,
as a basis for personal jurisdiction and on the further ground that such
jurisdiction would constitute an undue burden on interstate com-
merce.27 RF&P's activities in New York included freight solicitation
by two employees, one being a New York resident; sale and issuance by
connecting railroads of coupon tickets and through bills of lading
covering carriage over RF&P's tracks, for which RF&P received com-
pensation; and daily presence within the state of RFgcP's freight cars
in interstate trains operated by connecting railroads.28 The district
20 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 855 U.S. 220, 222 (1957).
2195 US. 714 (1877).
22 826 US. 310 (1945).
23 Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 854 U.S. 416, 418 (1957).
24 326 U.S. at 316, quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 US. 457, 463 (1940).
26 Hanson v. Denckla, 857 U.S. 235, 251 (1958).
26 489 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1970).
27 Id. at 18-19.
28 Id. at 19.
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court denied the motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction, and RF&P
appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the
above activities constituted sufficient "minimum contacts" to allow
personal jurisdiction and affirmed the dismissal.29 The court noted that
solicitation of business in New York is alone insufficient to provide a
basis for personal jurisdiction,"0 but found necessary additional acts.
Both the court of appeals, Chief Judge Lumbard dissenting, and the
district court found that RF&P was "doing business" in New York
even though the classic indicia of corporate presence were absent.3 '
Chief Judge Lumbard found no purposeful activity and concluded that
the majority's affirmance practically subjected all important railroads
to suit in any state in which it solicited freight business. 32
On reconsideration in banc the Second Circuit indicated that its
affirmance did not entail the broad holding feared by Chief Judge
Lumbard. The court explicitly held that the requirements of the com-
merce clause, herein more strict than those of the due process clause,
were satisfied in this case by elements additional to RF&P's New York
activities, viz., plaintiff's New York residence, RF&P's regular opera-
tion of through-passenger trains to and from New York over the tracks
in question, and extensive sale in New York of tickets for said trains.33
Judge Kaufman concurred in the result without comment on the rela-
tive stringency of the commerce and due process clauses and on the
necessity of through-train connections to the decision.3 4 Judge Hays
and Feinberg also concurred in the result but differed with the major-
ity's view that plaintiff's New York residence is essential to jurisdiction
in this case. 5 Chief Judge Lumbard again dissented, on the ground
that RFScP had not engaged in purposeful activity in New York.36
The Second Circuit's final affirmance in Scanapico was a wise
resolution of a difficult issue. By surprisingly reasserting the "undue
burden of interstate commerce" standard, the court enabled itself to
strike a fair balance between the conflicting interests of plaintiffs and
nondomiciliary defendants. When the additional elements mentioned
above are present, the burden on interstate commerce is not unreason-
able; in their absence the burden would be unreasonable.
29 Id. at 21.
So ld. at 20, citing Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc., 19 N.Y. 2d 533, 537, 227 N.E.2d
851, 853, 281 N.Y.S.2d 41, 44 (1967).
31 Id. at 22 (Lumbard, C.J., dissenting).
S2 Id. at 21, 25.
83 Id. at 26.
34 Id. at 28 (Kaufnan, J., concurring).
85 Id. at 28-29 (Hays, J., concurring in result).
86 Id. at 29 (Lumbard, C.J., dissenting).
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